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RICHARDS II TAKES A BITE OUT OF
FORENSIC SCIENCE
Michelle Cornell-Davis*
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 21, 2016, William Richards walked out of West Valley
Detention Center in Rancho Cucamonga, California with his arms
raised in triumph.1 After fifteen years of wrongful imprisonment,
Richards had been released.2 His long journey to exoneration
included two trips to the California Supreme Court and the
amendment of a law. When asked what he wanted to do first now
that he was out of prison, Richards responded that he just wanted
some real food to eat.3
The story of William Richards is an incredible one. His case
speaks to how some wrongful convictions occur and what steps can
and should be taken to prevent them. In re Richards (Richards I)4
and In re Richards II (Richards II),5 provide an insightful example of
the ongoing court-legislature dialogue taking place as a result of the
larger national conversation on the need for reliable forensic science
standards in criminal cases.6 The conversation began because data
* J.D. Candidate, May 2018, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Thanks to the editors and
staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their help in editing this Article. Thanks
especially to Paula Mitchell and Hayden Adams for their guidance, feedback, and encouragement.
Lastly, thanks to my family and friends for their support.
1. Man Convicted Of Killing His Wife 23 Years Ago Released From Prison In
Rancho Cucamonga,
CBS
L.A.
(June
21,
2016,
6:06
PM),
http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2016/06/21/man-convicted-of-killing-his-wife-23-years-agoreleased-from-prison-in-rancho-cucamonga.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 289 P.3d 860 (Cal. 2012).
5. 371 P.3d 195 (Cal. 2016).
6. See EXECUTIVE OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI.
AND TECH., FORENSIC S CIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF
FEATURE-COMPARISON
METHODS
(Sept.
2016)
[hereinafter
PCAST
Report],
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_s
cience_report_final.pdf
(advising the President on the state of forensic science and
recommending steps to ensure validity of forensic sciences used in the courtroom); see also Judge
Alex Kozinski, Rejecting Voodoo Science in the Courtroom, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 19, 2016,
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gleaned from wrongful conviction cases nationwide have exposed
numerous and serious flaws in what has passed as forensic science in
the courtroom.7 Today, the National Registry of Exonerations counts
2,006 people who have been exonerated since 1989.8 Of these 1,905
cases, an estimated 480 of them involved false or misleading forensic
evidence.9 Richards I and Richards II illustrate how the California
Supreme Court and the California Legislature addressed the use of
false or misleading forensic evidence in a case involving bitemark
evidence.
Following this introduction, Part II discusses the factual
background that led to William Richards’s wrongful conviction and
the procedural journey that led to his eventual release. Part III
analyzes the outcome of the case in light of the current dialogue
about forensic science. Part IV concludes that the court’s decision,
and the legislature’s response—amending a statute to address the
problem identified by the court—are steps in the right direction
towards alleviating some of the wrongs caused by the unreliability of
some forensic sciences administered in criminal investigations.
II. BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Scene
Though August 10, 1993, started out as an average day for
William Richards, by that evening it would turn into the stuff of
7:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/rejecting-voodoo-science-in-the-courtroom-1474328199
(calling for swift implementation of the PCAST Report recommendations and criticizing the use
of unreliable forensic science in the courtroom).
7. For example, the National Registry of Exonerations is a project developed by the
University of California Irvine, the University of Michigan Law School, and the Michigan State
University College of Law. The purpose of the Registry is to “collect[], analyze[], and
disseminate[] information about all known exonerations of innocent criminal defendants in the
United States, from 1989 to the present.” Our Mission, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/mission.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
8. Detailed
View,
NAT’L
REGISTRY
OF
EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (from “Using the Registry” tab,
select “Detailed View”) (last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
9. Id. (from “Using the Registry” tab, select “Detailed View”; then filter by “False or
Misleading Forensic Evidence”). The National Registry finds “false or misleading forensic
evidence” when an “[e]xoneree’s conviction was based at least in part on forensic information
that was (1) caused by errors in forensic testing, (2) based on unreliable or unproven methods, (3)
expressed with exaggerated and misleading confidence, or (4) fraudulent.” False or Misleading
Forensic
Evidence
(F/MFE),
NAT’L
REGISTRY
OF
EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/glossary.aspx#FMFE (last visited Oct. 27,
2016).
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nightmares.10 Just after midnight, Richards came home from work to
a horrifying scene.11 His wife, Pamela Richards, had been manually
strangled, severely beaten with two fist-sized rocks, and her skull
was crushed with a concrete steppingstone.12 At the time, William
and Pamela were living on an isolated piece of “property in the
Mojave Desert in San Bernardino County.”13
Upon discovering her body, Richards called 911 three times:
once at 11:58 p.m. and then twice more in the next half hour.14 San
Bernardino County Sheriff’s Deputy Nourse arrived at the scene
shortly after 12:30 a.m.15 However, it would be about three more
hours before any homicide detectives arrived and another few hours
after that until the scene itself was finally processed. 16 During that
time, the police failed to secure the Richards’s dogs, and the dogs
partially buried Pamela during the night.17
Richards quickly became a suspect when police were unable to
find anyone else who had been present at the crime scene.18 He was
charged with his wife’s murder, and in 1997, after three mistrials, a
jury found him guilty.19 At trial, the evidence against Richards was
thin. The prosecution’s “evidentiary silver bullet”20 was a lesion
found on Pamela’s body that allegedly matched Richards’s teeth.21
During the fourth trial, the prosecution called Dr. Norman Sperber,
an odontologist, to testify as a forensic dental expert and explain the
comparison and match.22 Dr. Sperber testified that the lesion was an
abnormal human bitemark.23 He further testified that the mark
10. Update: William Richards Released on June 21, 2016!, CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT,
https://californiainnocenceproject.org/read-their-stories/william-richards (last visited Nov. 8,
2016).
11. Richards II, 371 P.3d 195, 199 (2016).
12. Id. at 198, 200.
13. Id. at 197.
14. Id. at 198.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 199.
17. Richards II, 371 P.3d at 199.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 197. The first two mistrials were due to hung juries. The third mistrial was due to
the trial court recusing itself during jury selection. In the fourth trial, the jury was deadlocked
until it received further instruction on “reasonable doubt,” after which it found Richards guilty of
first degree murder. Id.
20. Michelle Ahronovitz, SB 694: How Low Can You Go? Reducing the Evidentiary
Standard for State Habeas Corpus Petitions, 47 THE U. OF PAC. L. REV . 616, 617 (2016).
21. Richards II, 371 P.3d at 201–02.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 202.
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matched a casting of Richards’s teeth and that, based on his personal
experience, “one or two or less” out of 100 people would have such a
dental abnormality.24 Richards was sentenced to 25 years to life, and
in August 2000, his conviction was affirmed on appeal.25
B. Post-Conviction Procedural History
1. Subsequent Habeas Proceedings
In 2007, Richards filed a writ of habeas corpus in San
Bernardino County Superior Court.26 His habeas petition asserted
that his conviction was based on false evidence and that there was
now new evidence proving his innocence.27
A key part of Richards’s evidence was a declaration from Dr.
Sperber, the prosecution’s forensic dentist, in which he repudiated
his trial testimony regarding the bitemark match.28 Dr. Sperber’s
declaration stated, “With the benefit of all of the photographs [of the
crime scene and Pamela’s injuries], and with my added experience, I
would not now testify as I did in 1997.”29 He further stated, “I cannot
now say with certainty that the injury on the victim’s hand is a
human bitemark injury.”30
The 2007 habeas petition not only included Dr. Sperber’s
recantation, but also other declarations and reports by forensic dental
experts. 31 Using new technology not previously available at
Richards’s jury trial, they corrected the angular distortion from the
autopsy photograph and compared the corrected photograph to a
digital exemplar of Richards’s lower teeth.32 Based on their
comparisons, the experts could not positively state that it was
Richards’s bitemark on the victim’s hand.33
The superior court granted Richards habeas relief, and the
district attorney appealed.34 The court of appeal reversed the ruling,
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id. at 197.
In re Richards, No. E049135, 2010 WL 4681260, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2010).
Id.
Richards I, 289 P.3d 860, 863 (2012).
Id. at 866.
Id.
Id. at 871.
Id.
Id.
In re Richards, No. E049135, 2010 WL 4681260, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2010).
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on the ground that “the new evidence . . . failed to undermine the
prosecution’s entire case and point unerringly to his innocence.”35
Then, in 2013, the California Supreme Court upheld the court of
appeal’s reversal by a 4-3 majority.36 The court reasoned that Dr.
Sperber’s recanted testimony did not qualify as “false evidence”
under California Penal Code Section 1473.37 This section provided
that “a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited
to, the following reasons: (1) False evidence that is substantially
material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was
introduced against a person at any hearing or trial relating to his or
her incarceration. . . .”38 The court interpreted “false evidence” to
mean that unless there were “any significant advances in the expert’s
field of expertise or in any technologies employed by the expert,” the
witness’s original opinion is not actually false merely because the
opinion changes at a later date.39 The court held that neither Dr.
Sperber’s recantation nor the new technology used by the other
experts was enough to show that Sperber’s trial testimony was
“objectively untrue.”40
Having found that Richards failed to satisfy the “false evidence”
standard, the court then turned to whether he met the “new evidence”
standard for habeas relief, which, at the time, required new evidence
to “point unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability.”41 After
analyzing the cumulative effect of all the evidence presented in the
habeas petition, the court found that he also failed to meet this
standard, and consequently denied him habeas relief.42
The Richards I dissent, however, maintained that the majority
incorrectly “heighten[ed] the standard of proof required to show the
falsity of expert testimony” and that the underlying basis of Dr.
Sperber’s testimony, as well as Dr. Sperber’s ultimate conclusion,
had been proven false by a preponderance of the evidence.43 Given
the impact of Dr. Sperber’s trial testimony on the jury, the dissent
35. Id. at *16.
36. Richards I, 289 P.3d at 863–64.
37. Id. at 863–64.
38. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1473 (West 2016).
39. Richards I, 289 P.3d at 872; Richards II, 371 P.3d 195, 206 (2016).
40. Richards I, 289 P.3d at 872.
41. In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 739 (Cal. 1993) (quoting People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179,
1246 (1990)).
42. Richards I, 289 P.3d at 876.
43. Id. at 880 (Liu, J., dissenting).
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concluded that it was also “reasonably probable that the verdict
would have been different without his testimony.”44
2. Legislative Response to Richards I
In response to the Richards I interpretation of false evidence, the
California legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1058, which
added subdivision (e)(1) to section 1473, effective January 1, 2015.45
Subdivision (e)(1) states, “For purposes of this section, ‘false
evidence’ includes opinions of experts that have either been
repudiated by the expert who originally provided the opinion at a
hearing or trial or that have been undermined by later scientific
research or technological advances.”46 In revising this section, the
California legislature specifically sought to address and correct the
Richards I decision.47 The Committee Report for the bill reiterated
that California’s false testimony statutes were designed to “protect an
individual from wrongful incarceration due to the false testimony of
a witness.”48 The report noted that the Richards I decision failed to
do this because it created “a higher bar” for overturning wrongful
convictions in cases of false expert testimony, effectively creating an
unjust distinction between the standard used for false testimony of
laypersons and expert witnesses. 49 The report found that this
interpretation of section 1473 was “unreasonable and exacerbates the
problem of wrongful convictions,” and concluded that “[q]uite
simply, this bill will keep innocent people out of prison.”50
III. THE REASONING OF THE COURT IN RICHARDS II
Richards filed another habeas petition in response to the
legislative change.51 He contended that under the newly amended
Section 1473, his conviction should be overturned.52 The court
decided his new petition in May 2016.53
44. Id. at 883; Richards II, 371 P.3d at 208.
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473(e)(1) (Deering 2017); Richards II, 371 P.3d at 196–97.
46. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473(e)(1) (Deering 2017).
47. Richards II, 371 P.3d at 196–97.
48. Assem. Comm. on Public Safety, Analysis of S.B. 1058, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess., at 4
(Cal. 2014).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Richards II, 371 P.3d at 195.
52. Id. at 197.
53. Id.
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In Richards II, the court concluded that under the new
legislation, an expert witness opinion could later be considered “false
evidence” under two circumstances: (1) if the expert repudiates his or
her own opinion given at trial; or (2) if the opinion given at trial is
undermined by subsequent “scientific research or technological
advances.”54 Under this new standard, the California Supreme Court
held that Dr. Sperber’s bitemark testimony qualified as false
evidence under both circumstances.55
Applying the first circumstance to this case, the court held it was
clear from Dr. Sperber’s later declaration that Dr. Sperber repudiated
his trial testimony.56 Applying the second circumstance to the case,
the court held that new technological advances also undermined Dr.
Sperber’s trial testimony because technology that was not available
at the time of Richards’s 1997 jury trial was used to correct the
angular distortion of the lesion depicted in the autopsy photograph,
and the corrected photograph formed the basis of the experts’
opinions during the habeas proceedings.57
The Attorney General argued that Richards’s false evidence
claim was a masked attempt to present a sufficiency of the evidence
claim, because if Dr. Sperber’s testimony was disregarded, the rest of
the trial evidence must still be considered and reweighed in
evaluating his guilt.58 The Attorney General contended this was
impermissible because a sufficiency of the evidence claim is not a
cognizable habeas corpus claim.59 The court rejected this argument,
stating that once a petitioner established false evidence, the standard
for relief is met as long as the false evidence is “material.”60
Evidence is material “if there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that, had it
not been introduced, the result would have been different.”61
Reasonable probability is established when the reviewing court’s
assurance in the outcome is undermined.62 Thus, a court must
determine whether the false evidence is material, rather than

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 207.
Id.
Id.
Richards II, 371 P.3d at 208.
Id. at 209.
Id.
Id.
In re Roberts, 60 P.3d 165, 174 (Cal. 2003).
In re Malone, 911 P.2d 468, 488 (Cal. 1996).
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examining whether the verdict may still be supported without the
false evidence.63
Applying the materiality standard, the court held that Dr.
Sperber’s testimony was, indeed, material.64 During the 1997 trial,
the defense had a substantial response to the prosecution’s case,
except for the bitemark evidence.65 Based on the facts of the case, it
was reasonably probable that the false evidence presented by Dr.
Sperber at Richards’s 1997 jury trial affected the outcome of that
proceeding, especially given his impressive credentials at the time.66
The court thus held Richards had met the burden of demonstrating
“false evidence” under both circumstances and that the false
evidence was material, and consequently granted Richards habeas
relief.67
IV. ANALYSIS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF RICHARDS II
It is the position of this Comment that Richards II was decided
correctly. First, the new legislation was appropriately applied to the
facts of the case; second, the petition was not successive because the
claim was based on new legislation; and third, the outcome parallels
the current national conversation about the reliability of forensic
evidence, including bitemark comparison.
A. The Court-Legislature Dialogue
On its own, Richards II is a straightforward application of the
law. The court received a new standard that was specifically directed
at remedying the injustice of Richards I.68 Applying the new
standard, the court found that Dr. Sperber’s trial testimony
constituted false evidence and granted Richards relief. Thus, the
court upheld the purpose of the new legislation: to eliminate an
“unjust distinction” between lay and expert testimony, which if left

63. Richards II, 371 P.3d at 209.
64. Id. at 210–11.
65. Id. (including responses to shoe prints, blood spatter, and the time of death).
66. Id. at 210. (credentials included more than 40 years of dentistry experience, acting as
chief forensic dentist for two counties, testifying in more than 100 cases, and receiving “a
congressional appointment to set up a national system to identify missing persons through dental
records.”).
67. Id. at 211.
68. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473(e)(1) (Deering 2017); Richards II, 371 P.3d at 196–97.
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uncorrected would “[exacerbate] the problem of wrongful
convictions.”69
Yet, when viewed in its procedural context, Richards II serves
as an encouraging example of court-legislature dialogue and a
heartening shift in policy for prisoners seeking exoneration. Because
of the procedural posture of this case and the conversation between
the legislature and the courts, there is now stronger, clearer statutory
language, which will allow innocent persons convicted by faulty
forensic evidence to more easily seek post-conviction review of their
cases. 70
Moreover, Richards II is part of a broader dialogue taking place
in California about standards for habeas petitions. For example, until
recently there was no codified standard of proof for a habeas petition
brought on the basis of new evidence.71 The standard was based on
case law which held new evidence “must undermine the entire
prosecution case and point unerringly to innocence or reduced
culpability,” and “if a reasonable jury could have rejected the
evidence presented, a petitioner has not satisfied his burden.”72 This
demanding standard, which was one of the highest in the nation,73
was eliminated when Senate Bill 1134 was signed into effect in
September 2016.74 Under the new amendment to Cal. Penal Code
section 1473, the standard was lowered to “new evidence exists that
is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such
decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not
changed the outcome at trial.”75 This amendment makes California’s
post-conviction standard for new evidence consistent with the
post-conviction standards of 43 other states.76 These changes in law
regarding standards for false evidence and new evidence, of which
the Richards saga has played a part, will hopefully lead to more
exonerations in cases of wrongful convictions in California and
“[give] a fallible system a better chance to remedy mistakes.”77
69. S. B. No. 1058, Reg. Sess. 2013–2014 (Cal. June 13, 2014).
70. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473(e)(1) (Deering 2017).
71. Assemb. Comm. on Public Safety, Analysis of S.B. 1134, at 7 (Cal. 2016).
72. In re Lawley, 179 P.3d 891, 897 (Cal. 2008).
73. S. Rules Comm., Analysis of S.B. 1134, at 7 (Cal. 2016).
74. S.B. No. 1134, Ch. 785 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016).
75. Id.
76. S. Rules Comm., Analysis of S.B. 1134, at 5 (Cal. 2016).
77. Jaclyn Gioiosa, New Bill Makes It Easier for the Wrongfully Convicted to Prove Their
Innocence, N. CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT (Sept. 28, 2016), http://law.scu.edu/northern-california-
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B. Bitemark Evidence
The need for a more inclusive false evidence standard for habeas
petitions is uniquely highlighted in the Richards case because
bitemark comparison is a particularly unreliable forensic science.
Forensic odontology, which is the application of dentistry to the law,
has come under heavy criticism in recent years.78 Forensic
odontology includes several fields of study, such as identification of
unknown remains, bitemark comparison, interpretation of oral injury,
and dental malpractice.79 Bitemark comparison, which was used in
Richards’s case, is considered the most controversial of these areas.80
Forensic identification for bitemarks involves two steps.81 The
first step is comparison, where the expert compares a mark or imprint
to a known source to determine whether they are similar enough to
be called a match.82 The second step considers “the probability that
the imprint and implement came from the same source.”83 Significant
risks of error are involved in both of these steps.84 Bitemarks face
practical difficulties.85 Because skin is elastic, pliable, and reactive, it
is not a reliable material for bitemark transfers.86 Skin stretches,
swells, bruises, and becomes inflamed, all of which can lead to
distorted images of the biter’s dentition.87 Additionally, “no thorough
innocence-project/new-bill-makes-it-easier-for-the-wrongfully-convicted-to-prove-theirinnocence.
78. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A
PATH
FORWARD
42
(2009)
[hereinafter
NAS
Report],
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf. Furthermore, this criticism has not just
been limited to the world of forensic science; bitemark science has also garnered attention in the
national media. See Radley Balko, How the Flawed “Science” of Bite Mark Analysis Has Sent
Innocent
People
to
Prison,
WASH.
POST
(Feb. 13,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/02/13/how-the-flawed-science-ofbite-mark-analysis-has-sent-innocent-people-to-jail/ (part one of a four part article series
discussing the flaws and history of bitemark evidence).
79. NAS Report, supra note 78, at 173.
80. Id. Key areas of contention include “the accuracy of human skin as a reliable registration
material for bitemarks, the uniqueness of human dentition, the techniques used for analysis, and
the role of examiner bias.” Id. at 178.
81. Adam Deitch, An Inconvenient Tooth: Forensic Odontology Is an Inadmissible Junk
Science When It Is Used to Match Teeth to Bitemarks in Skin, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1205, 1216
(2009).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. NAS Report, supra note 78, at 175.
86. Brief for Michael J. Saks et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 20, In re
Richards, 371 P.3d 195 (Cal. 2016) (No. S223651) [hereinafter Amici Brief].
87. Id.
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study has been conducted of large populations to establish the
uniqueness of bitemarks [and] theoretical studies include more teeth
than are seen in most bitemarks submitted for comparison.”88 There
is also “no central repository of bitemarks and patterns.”89 Thus, it is
possible that a purported match may not actually be a match at all, or
could be the result of coincidence.90
In addition to the disputed methods involved, forensic
odontology “suffers from the potential for large bias among bitemark
experts.”91 This bias can arise because of police agencies providing
“the suspects for comparison and a limited number of models from
which to choose from in comparing the evidence.”92 Bias may also
arise as a result of the pressure to identify a suspect in “highly
sensationalized and prejudicial cases.”93 Moreover, this bias remains
uncorrected because blind comparisons, or a second expert’s opinion,
are rarely called for.94
Finally, there is an unsettling lack of standardization across the
field.95 Although the American Board of Forensic Odontology has
developed guidelines for the analysis of bitemarks, there is still no
general agreement among practicing forensic odontologists regarding
national or international standards for comparison.96 Experts have
differed widely in their evaluations in many instances, and “forensic
dentists are free to use whichever method they happen to be familiar
with or prefer.”97
Given the lack of standardization and the inherent imprecision
of scientific methods employed in bitemark matching, many critics
have called into question the current use of bitemark matching in
criminal investigations. The most prominent critique of bitemark
evidence came in a report in 2009 by the National Research Council,
a subdivision of the National Academy of Sciences.98 The council
88. NAS Report, supra note 78, at 174.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 174–75.
93. Id. at 175.
94. NAS Report, supra note 78, at 175.
95. Id.; Amici Brief, supra note 86, at 20–21.
96. NAS Report, supra note 78, at 175; Amici Brief, supra note 86, at 20–21.
97. Amici Brief, supra note 86, at 21.
98. NAS Report, supra note 78, at iii. The goal of the council is to “associate the broad
community of science and technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and
advising the federal government.” Id.
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concluded that there was “no evidence of an existing scientific basis
for identifying an individual to the exclusion of all others,” and
found “a lack of valid evidence to support many of the assumptions
made by forensic dentists during bitemark comparisons.”99 Further,
in an amicus brief submitted in the Richards II case, a set of
scientists, statisticians, law-and-science scholars, and practitioners
found that the foundations for bitemark identification were
unsound.100 They suggest that future research may solve some of the
issues of bitemark identification, but conclude that bitemark experts
“have yet to establish either the validity of their approach or the
accuracy of their conclusions, and the courts have been utterly
ineffective in addressing this problem.”101
Most recently, a report released by the President’s Council of
Advisors on Science and Technology (“PCAST”) in September 2016
concluded, “bitemark analysis does not meet the scientific standards
for foundational validity, and is far from meeting such standards.”102
The report acknowledges that some practitioners fear the fall of
bitemark evidence in the courtroom because it “could hamper efforts
to convict defendants in some cases.”103 Yet the report counters that
if this is a true concern, the answer is not to “admit expert testimony
based on invalid and unreliable methods, but rather to attempt to
develop scientifically valid methods.”104 Ultimately, the PCAST
reporters conclude that the probability of making bitemark analysis
scientifically reliable is low, and they advise against putting
resources into it.105
Considering these acknowledgements that bitemark evidence is
less of a science and more of a guessing game, bitemark evidence
should not be relied upon in any degree.106 If bitemark science is not

99. Id. at 176 (quoting D. Sweet & I. A. Pretty, The Scientific Basis for Human Bitemark
Analysis—A Critical Review, 41 SCI. & JUST. 85, 85–92 (2001)).
100. See generally Amici Brief, supra note 86.
101. Id. at 45 (quoting NAS Report, supra note 78, at 53).
102. PCAST Report, supra note 6, at 87.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Deitch, supra note 81, at 1205 (concluding that courts should refuse to admit bitemark
matching testimony in the courtroom); Paul C. Giannelli, Bite Mark Testimony Under Attack, 31
CRIM. JUST., Summer 2016, at 40, 40–41 (2016) (concluding that bitemark science “should be
challenged at every trial in which it is offered”).
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to be disregarded entirely, there must be a safety net for prisoners
who have been wrongfully convicted by faulty science.
C. Richards II and the Future of Forensic Science
Richards II was not just decided correctly because bitemark
evidence is unreliable. In addition to bitemark evidence, many other
types of forensic science have recently been called into question.107
There has been increasing recognition that many of the methods used
in the forensic sciences are outdated.108 In the wake of the mounting
number of exonerations and the growing awareness of faulty forensic
science, Richards II stands as an important guard against unreliable
or changing fields of forensic science.
When forensic tests, such as bitemark matching, were first
developed, they were often created in crime laboratories to evaluate
evidence from a particular crime scene.109 As a result, many
techniques were never subjected to scientific scrutiny or analysis,
and researching their limitations and foundations has not been a top
priority.110 Despite this, many forensic sciences were long considered
highly reliable. However, since criminal investigators began
employing DNA analysis in the 1980s, this view of forensic sciences
has begun to change.111 DNA analysis is now used to reexamine
cases of prisoners who claim they are innocent. As a result of DNA
testing, the number of exonerations has grown rapidly across the
country in recent years.112 Many of the prior convictions which have
been overturned involved faulty forensic science,113 calling into
question entire fields of expertise.114 For example, arson science,
which was once highly regarded, is now largely considered a “junk
science” and may have led to the wrongful execution of Todd

107. See PCAST Report, supra note 6.
108. Id.; see also Richards I, 289 P.3d 860, 877 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., dissenting).
109. NAS Report, supra note 78, at 42.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 40.
112. PCAST Report, supra note 6, at 26.
113. Id. (“DNA-based re-examination of past cases, moreover, has led so far to the
exonerations of 342 defendants, including 20 who had been sentenced to death, and to the
identification of 147 real perpetrators.”).
114. Judge Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC., i, v
(2015) (A few of these questionable “sciences” include bloodstain pattern identification, foot and
tire print identification, and ballistics.).
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Willingham.115 Hair microscopy, which is the matching and
comparison of hairs, has also been significantly undermined, as
illustrated in the case of Santae Tribble.116 Other types of pattern
evidence, including firearm analysis and shoeprint comparison,
remain highly suspect.117
Considering the widespread and justifiable skepticism
concerning the use of forensic science, the standard employed in
Richards I was neither just nor appropriate. It created a false
distinction between lay testimony and expert witness testimony.118
Under Richards I, an eyewitness could recant his testimony based on
his being mistaken at the time and satisfy the false evidence standard
“because the perceptual basis for [his] eyewitness testimony turned
out to be false.”119 Yet the testimony of an expert witness, whose
opinions are also dependent on inferential and perceptual abilities,
needed to be objectively false before a court could consider it false
evidence.120 As the dissent in Richards I correctly observed, there is
no reason to treat expert testimony differently: “Just as the truth or
falsity of eyewitness testimony under section 1473(b) depends on the
truth or falsity of underlying facts concerning the witness’s
perceptual abilities, the truth or falsity of expert testimony depends
on the truth or falsity of underlying facts essential to the expert’s
inferential method and ultimate opinion.”121
Richards II eliminates the distinction between expert and lay
opinion testimony and makes it possible for petitioners to establish
false evidence through recanting expert testimony. The California
115. David Grann, Trial by Fire, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009,
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/09/07/trial-by-fire.
116. For example, Santae Tribble was convicted of murder and sentenced to twenty years in a
case where the only physical evidence against him were strands of hair found at the scene. The
hairs, which the forensic hair expert at trial testified belonged to Tribble at odds of 10 million to
1, were retested in 2012. It was discovered that one of those hairs belonged to a dog. Spencer S.
Hsu, Santae Tribble Cleared in 1978 Murder Based on DNA Hair Test, WASH. POST, (Dec. 14,
2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/dc-judge-exonerates-santae-tribble-of-1978murder-based-on-dna-hair-test/2012/12/14/da71ce00-d02c-11e1-b630190a983a2e0d_story.html?utm_term=.4eacaf84a78a.
117. Kozinski, supra note 114, at v.
118. See Richards I, 289 P.3d 860, 876 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 877.
120. Id. at 870–71 (majority opinion) (“[W]hen new expert opinion testimony is offered that
criticizes or casts doubt on opinion testimony given at trial, one has not necessarily established
that the opinion at trial was false. Rather, in that situation one has merely demonstrated the
subjective component of expert opinion testimony.”).
121. Id. at 878 (Liu, J., dissenting).
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District Attorney’s Association opposed the passing of Senate Bill
1058, arguing that eliminating this distinction was unnecessary.122
The Association claimed that false expert witness testimony was
sufficiently addressed through laws already in place, such as perjury
laws.123 However, perjury statutes do not protect against false
testimony the expert witness believed to be correct at the time.124
Thus, Richards II and the amended standard for false evidence are
appropriate because they allow a habeas petitioner to challenge false
expert testimony made in good faith, while still “protecting the
credibility and reputation of expert witnesses.”125
Neither should critics be concerned that amendments like Senate
Bill 1058 and cases like Richards II weaken the finality of judgments
and undermine the adversarial and legal system. While there are
important reasons for ensuring finality in the criminal justice system,
finality exists in tension with ensuring the accuracy of outcomes.126
Richards II will not overthrow that balance. First, the Richards II
standard is not too low; even the California District Attorney’s
Association agrees that “persons who have been convicted as a result
of flawed opinion should be able to file for a writ of habeas
corpus.”127 Richards II and the new standard eliminate the distinction
between lay witnesses and expert witnesses, but a court must still
“make a finding that it is reasonably probable that the verdict at trial
would have been different without the expert’s testimony before
granting habeas relief.”128 Additionally, concerns about finality may
also be alleviated by participation from the executive branch in this
current dialogue. Though Richards’s case primarily involves the
conversation between the court and the legislature, the executive
branch also has an opportunity to participate in the conversation. For
example, one form of participation is through conviction review
122. S.B. No. 1058, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess., at 5–6 (Cal. 2014).
123. Id.
124. Natasha Machado, Chapter 623: Giving the Wrongfully Convicted A Better Chance at
Review, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 387, 393 (2014).
125. Id.
126. Laurie L. Levenson, Searching for Injustice: The Challenge of Postconviction Discovery,
Investigation, and Litigation, 87 S. CAL. L. REV., 545, 551 (2014). Legitimate reasons for finality
include allowing victims “if possible, [to] move on with their lives, and [allowing] law
enforcement officials and prosecutors [to] begin to address other cases.” Id. at 546.
127. S.B. No. 1058, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess., at 6 (Cal. 2014).
128. Assemb. Comm. on Public Safety, Analysis of S.B. 1058, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess., at 4
(Cal. 2014).
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units. These units originated in Santa Clara, California, in 2004 and
Dallas, Texas, in 2007.129 The purpose of these units is to “[conduct]
extrajudicial, fact-based review[s] of secured convictions to
investigate plausible allegations of actual innocence.”130 Conviction
review units are typically part of the local prosecutor’s office and are
“dedicated to collaborative, good-faith case reviews designed to
ensure the factual integrity of a conviction should be independent,
flexible, and transparent in its work.”131 Through these units, the
executive branch can constructively participate while still equally
focusing on accuracy and finality.
The criminal justice system at the very least should
acknowledge the growth, development, and change that take place in
forensic science in order to ensure accuracy, as well as finality.132 A
system that convicts an innocent person based on unreliable science
and data is not a reliable system, and it needs a mechanism for
correcting what will be inevitable wrongs.
V. CONCLUSION
Certain areas of forensic science, particularly bitemark
comparison, are now considered unreliable or outdated. Furthermore,
forensic sciences are not static. As technology develops, the
methodology in these fields changes with it. People used to think the
Earth was flat, but if the sailor today decided to navigate his ship
based on the idea that the earth was flat, he would be considered
crazy. The same is true for forensic science. Why would we choose
to affirm decisions based on the opinions of experts who used
methods we know to be outdated and unreliable, especially in light of
an expert’s recantation of prior testimony?
Cases like Richards II and laws like California Penal Code
section 1473 are vital in updating our legal system to reflect the
reality of scientific progress. Some who are convicted are not guilty,
and to hold an innocent person in prison based on a technical
definition of “false evidence” is unjust. What Richards II illustrates
is that we have robust systems in place to address flaws once they are
129. John Hollway, Conviction Review Units: A National Perspective, PENN L.: FAC.
SCHOLARSHIP,
Apr.
2016,
at
1,
10
n.5,
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1614.
130. Id. at 2.
131. Id.
132. Levenson, supra note 126, at 551.
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identified. It is heartening to see that both the courts and the
legislatures are now attuned to the forensic evidence issues that are
surfacing with increased frequency, and that they are prepared to
address these critical issues.
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